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Tobias Schlicht argues that subjective character derives from the integration of
mental states into a complex of representations of the organism and that therefore
there is no need try to account for subjective character in terms of “reflexivity” or
self-acquaintance, as I do. He further argues that the proper subject of conscious-
ness is the whole organism and not the episode or stream of consciousness, as I
maintain. He maintains that his account solves problems about the individuation
and synchronic unity of conscious mental states that mine does not. While I agree
that we need an account of the individuation of episodes of consciousness and an
account of the synchronic and diachronic unities of consciousness (something I
bracketed in my paper), I disagree that making the organism into the phenomeno-
logical subject of consciousness helps with these problems. However, I am willing
to concede that the organism is the subject of consciousness in some non-phe-
nomenological sense.
Keywords
Conscious vs. unconscious mental states | Individuation | Integration | Organism |
Phenomenological subject | Reflexivity | Self-acquaintance | Unity of conscious-
ness
Author
Kenneth Williford
williford@uta.edu   
The University of Texas
Arlington, TX, U.S.A.
Commentator
Tobias Schlicht
tobias.schlicht@rub.de   
Ruhr-Universität
Bochum
Editors
Thomas Metzinger
metzinger@uni-mainz.de   
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany
Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt@monash.edu   
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
1 Introduction
In his insightful commentary on my contribu-
tion  to  Open  MIND,  Tobias  Schlicht  argues
for  the  following  claims:  (1)  The  subject  of
conscious  episodes  should  be  identified  with
the  organism  whose  episodes  they  are  (Sch-
licht this collection, pp. 2, 8-9). (2) Once we
understand  how  non-conscious  mental  states
(perceptions, thoughts, etc.) become conscious
by  being  integrated  into  the  underlying  or-
ganismal creature-consciousness,  we will have
understood all that is important about how a
conscious  state  is  endowed  with  subjective
character  (Schlicht this  collection,  pp.  5-6).
And,  (3),  such an account would obviate an
account  like  mine,  since  there  would  be  no
need  to  imagine  that  individual  episodes  of
consciousness  have  a  sort  of  self-contained
subjective  character  (which  I  construe  in
terms  of  “reflexivity”  or  self-acquaintance)—
instead, their subjective character would just
derive from their integration into the underly-
ing  creature-consciousness,  which  ipso  facto
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makes the organism to be the subject-pole of
the episode (Schlicht this collection, pp. 5-8).
Part of claim (3), as stated, (the part that
begins with “since”) is my interpretation of Sch-
licht, since he does not spell out the claim in
great detail, given limitations of space. So my
arguments directed at that interpretation may
not target exactly what Schlicht had in mind.
But claims (1) and (2) are stated very clearly
(Schlicht this  collection,  pp. 5-6,  8-9).  In  this
reply, I will take issue with these three claims
and discuss some of Schlicht’s other claims in
relation to them.
2 The phenomenological subject and the 
organism
I readily admit (and did so in the contribution)
that the claim that the subject of consciousness
is the episode (or stream) of consciousness itself
is rather counterintuitive.1 However, part of this
counterintuitiveness  can  be  ameliorated  easily
enough.  To  begin  with,  I  should  have  made
clearer that I was talking about what I like to
call  the  “phenomenological  subject”  of  con-
sciousness. I did use the phrase, but I did not
explain it and should have done so. The phe-
nomenological subject is just  that to which the
objects  of  phenomenal  consciousness  seem to
appear. In other words, granted that conscious-
ness seems to have a subject-object, relational
structure, the phenomenological subject is just
the subject-pole  of  conscious  experience  in  so
far as it is given (reflectively as well as pre-re-
flectively). 
Now, suppose we interpreted the Humean
“no-self” intuition in the strongest possible way.
In that case, we would conclude that there is no
phenomenological subject at all. As I argued in
the paper, I think the Humean intuition is not
to be dismissed. However, I do think that the
subject-object  polarity  of  consciousness  is  a
datum and not projected or inferred. If one is
already  sympathetic  with  the  idea  that  con-
sciousness is always aware of itself (is its own
“secondary  object”,  as  Brentano  put  it  (see
1 Indeed, after hearing me present a version of the target paper (at TCU in
2014), Michael Tye told me that even on a charitable reading, the claim
lacks a truth value. At least, that’s what I understood him to mean. 
Brentano 1995, pp. 128ff.), or is always non-pos-
itionally conscious of itself, as Sartre put it (see
Sartre 2004, p. 8)),  then it  is  not much of  a
stretch to identify this feature of  “reflexivity”
with subjective character and, if we must reify,
make the episode or stream into the phenomen-
ological  subject.  As  long  as  one  understands
that by “subject” here, I just mean the subject-
pole of conscious experience, a pole that one is
phenomenally conscious of, then one will get my
meaning.  Given  a  commitment  both  to  some
version of the Humean intuition and to the in-
tuition  that  one  is  phenomenally  aware  that
consciousness has a subject-object polarity, one
will need to resolve the tension between these in
some way. Self-representationalism and self-ac-
quaintance theories can do this in a very elegant
way, I argued, a way that neither first-order nor
higher-order  representationalisms  can.  All  of
this is compatible with the evident fact that we
normally experience ourselves as having a body
in space that bears various relations to objects
in space; but the phenomenological subject of
consciousness should not, in my view, be identi-
fied with the body or with a representation of
the body.
One might, of course, use “subject of con-
sciousness” in different ways. One might, for ex-
ample, mean “that organism or system to which
we attribute  consciousness”  or  “that  which  is
the substrate of consciousness in an organism”.
We might then speak of the “metaphysical sub-
ject” or “ontological subject” of consciousness,
rather  than  the  “phenomenological  subject”.
The metaphysical subject of consciousness need
not appear to or be represented in conscious-
ness. I have nothing against the idea that the
organism (or a set of sub-processes of it) is the
metaphysical subject of consciousness. I grant,
moreover, that we normally speak in such a way
that the grammatical subject of attributions of
consciousness (or conscious mental states) is a
noun that refers to an organism. We say things
like “Skipper, my dog, sees his food coming” or
“The bird saw me walking toward it  and be-
came frightened”. Indeed, insofar as conscious-
ness is a property of or process going on in the
brain  of  organism,  there  is  nothing  erroneous
about  such  attributions.  However,  given  the
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falsity of animism and the commitment to what
I like to call  encephalism (the view that con-
sciousness resides in the brain), the ontology of
consciousness  cannot  just  be  read  off  of  the
grammar of such attributions, not that Schlicht
is suggesting that it could. 
It would, however, be more accurate to say
in the Skipper case that there is a process of
phenomenal  visual  consciousness  having  such-
and-such  representational  content  and  being
connected  in  such-and-such  a  way with  Skip-
per’s volitional, appetitive, and motor systems
(all,  of course, related to Skipper’s organismic
homeostatic  systems)  going  on  in  Skipper’s
brain when, in normal conditions,  the food is
presented to him. Of course, I just referred to
Skipper  qua organism multiple times in refor-
mulating this apparently simple attribution, but
that just has the effect of roughly localizing the
conscious process and, of course, connecting it
to Skipper’s behaviors and functions as an or-
ganism. No one should deny that consciousness,
as it has arisen in organisms with an evolution-
ary origin, has a biological function, though it is
highly debatable  that consciousness  should be
defined or analyzed in terms of such functions.
It may well be that it serves these organismic
functions but could exist in substrates that do
not have them or need them. In fact, I would
put my money on the claim that artificial con-
sciousness is possible in systems whose homeo-
static functions can be carried out in a way that
its consciousness does not contribute to  at all.
But that is a debate for another time.2 
The counterintuitiveness of claiming that
the phenomenological subject of consciousness is
the  episode  or  stream of  consciousness  might
derive  in  part  from the  oddness  such  a  view
would seem to introduce into our quotidian at-
tributions of conscious mental states, if we were
to try to make our ways of speaking match this
theory. It would be rather odd indeed to say,
“Skipper’s current episode of consciousness sees
the food coming”. But the view I defend does
not really legitimate such locutions. Those attri-
butions run together the phenomenological and
2 It is  also possible  that  something  other  than consciousness  could
carry out most (but not all) of the functions consciousness performs
in us and other organisms; this is also a debate for another time.
metaphysical notions of “the subject”. The sense
of counterintuitiveness that comes from saying
“the episode sees…” (etc.) stems from the fact
that the episode is  not the metaphysical sub-
ject. 
When we make normal attributions of con-
scious mental states to a creature, we encode in-
formation about the location or individuation of
the conscious episode (and this gets construed
as “ownership”—it’s Skipper’s seeing), informa-
tion  about  the  representational  content  and
modality or attitude the episode involves (food
and seeing, respectively, in this case), and a sort
of folk theory about the relational structure of
consciousness. That folk theory puts whole or-
ganisms or agents, as it were, “behind” the con-
scious mental state, as the point of view or sub-
ject pole from which the experience emanates
or, to use another metaphor famously attacked
by Dennett (see 1991, ch. 5), as the spectator in
the  “Cartesian  Theater”.  That  folk  theory  is
hopelessly homuncular, it seems to me. It offers
no analysis of what a subject is and gives no
hint as to what the real conditions of unity are
for either organisms or subjects. (By contrast,
self-representational  and self-acquaintance  the-
ories  try  to  preserve  what  is  right  about  the
Cartesian  Theater  intuition  while  avoiding  a
commitment to homuncularism.) 
When  we  say  “Skipper  sees”  we  do  not
really mean that Skipper is, as it were, behind
some sort of internal telescope looking out of his
eyes or at some internal screen, though the first
theory of seeing that some kids come up with is
indeed the homuncular  and regressive one ac-
cording to which there is a little person in our
heads looking at just such an internal screen. It
seems that what is encoded in the folk theory
implicit  in  our normal conscious  mental  state
attributions is something like a homuncular pro-
jection of our third-person experience of other
conscious  organisms onto the organism’s  first-
person experience. In other words, we see Skip-
per with his excited behavior and the food out
there in front of  him, some distance from his
body;  we  then  imagine  that  this  relationship
that we see “sideways on” (to borrow a phrase
from John McDowell, see e.g.,  McDowell 1994,
pp. 34-36) is,  so to speak, rotated 90 degrees
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and moved inside Skipper’s head—with Skipper
as  an  irreducible  agent  assuming the  position
behind the eyepiece of his internal periscope. 
That may be a bit too fanciful an exercise
in the conceptual archaeology of folk-psycholo-
gical  mental  state  ascriptions,  but  the  main
point  is  just  that  our  normal  attributions  of
conscious mentality seem to run together gener-
ally accurate information about individuation or
location  (“ownership”),  content,  and  attitude
with a naïve and homuncular picture of subject-
ive character.  So, yes, it is true, I would say,
that the organism is the subject of conscious-
ness in the sense that conscious episodes (so far
anyway)  take  place  in  organisms  (actually  in
their brains) and causally depend upon organis-
mic  metabolic  and  homeostatic  processes  for
their  existence.  In this  sense,  the organism is
the  metaphysical subject of consciousness,  and
this  is  properly  reflected  in  our  usual  mental
state attributions. However, I would emphatic-
ally (perhaps even hysterically) deny that the
whole organism could be the  phenomenological
subject of consciousness. This is something also
reflected in our usual attributions, but this is
because the metaphysical and phenomenological
subjects  are  simply  conflated  by  folk  psycho-
logy. The whole organism could not be the phe-
nomenological subject for two reasons.
First,  if  one agrees  with me,  as Schlicht
seems to, that subjective character and the sub-
ject-object polarity are phenomenally manifest
even  in  pre-reflective  consciousness,  but  one
adds to this the claim that the phenomenolo-
gical  subject  is  the  organism,  then  it  would
seem  to  follow  that  we  are  always  aware  of
ourselves qua organism when we are consciously
aware of anything—since, again, all conscious-
ness  by  hypothesis  has  subjective  character.
Now, this could mean either that we represent
ourselves qua organism or that we are acquain-
ted with ourselves (and we are, in fact, organ-
isms).  Surely we do not,  at  the level  of  con-
sciousness, represent ourselves qua organisms all
the time, unless all one means by that is that
consciousness has a biological function of some
sort (that is, in, say, the teleofunctional sense,
consciousness is  “about” the organism and its
ongoing relationship to the world). The latter is
undoubtedly true, but that is not a phenomeno-
logical characterization of subjective character;
rather it is a thesis about the function of con-
sciousness and its relation to organismal homeo-
stasis.  Of  course,  one could make an identity
claim according  to  which  subjective  character
(as experienced) really just is the suitably integ-
rated representation of the organism, but this
then would mean that one is embracing some
form of P-theory (a theory according to which
conscious  representational  states  are  distinct
from non-conscious ones in part because they
target some privileged object,  e.g.,  the organ-
ism, a substantial self). If the claim is taken to
mean that the organism is self-acquainted, then
I might be willing to agree depending on the
spin one puts on that claim. 
One might just mean that there is some
sub-process of the organism that is self-acquain-
ted (that is self-manifesting or directly phenom-
enally self-representing, if one prefers). If that is
all that is meant by the claim, then I can agree.
Something like this is exactly the position I de-
fend in the paper. After all, the central claim
was just  that  consciousness  is  self-acquainted.
And it was an unstated assumption of the paper
that consciousness is a sub-process of the brain,
and the brain a part of the organism. If, on the
other hand, one means that the whole organism
is directly acquainted with itself, this seems to
me to be either an unexamined endorsement of
commonsense, homuncular ways of making con-
scious  mental  state  attributions  (criticized
above) or the claim that consciousness necessar-
ily involves the entire organism.
The latter disjunct seems as false to me as
the former. Yes, the prolonged existence of con-
sciousness depends on the prolonged operation
of the essential metabolic and homeostatic func-
tions. And, indeed, almost certainly the meta-
bolic functions that support synaptic transmis-
sion  and some other  basic  neuronal  processes
are sine qua non for consciousness as it happens
to be implemented in human and animal brains.
But  none  of  the  specific  means  whereby  our
bodies  support  these  functions  have  to  be  in
place, it seems to me. 
We can have artificial hearts and artificial
respiration. In principle, we could offload all the
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metabolic  processes  outside  those  internal  to
the  nervous  system  to  non-natural  machines.
And  we  could  even,  in  principle,  replace  the
natural  generation  of  essential  neurotransmit-
ters with their artificial synthesis and, possibly,
artificial projections for distributing them in the
brain  properly.  Homeostasis  could  be  main-
tained artificially and, in principle, without the
relevant  brainstem  nuclei  needing  to  do  any-
thing anymore (unless, of course, some of their
activities  just  happen,  for  totally  contingent
evolutionary reasons, to be constitutively neces-
sary  for  the  occurrence  of  consciousness  in
brains like ours). 
In short, it is certainly physically possible
(though  technologically  beyond  our  current
means) to keep a brain alive and operating in a
“vat”! As long as we maintain those processes
that are the neural correlates of (are identical
to, in my view) consciousness, there would be
consciousness  in that brain in that vat.  I  am
sorry,  but  all  the  evidence  indicates  that  en-
cephalism is true. And it seems to me to be a
sort of externalist fetishism to think that con-
sciousness  literally  extends  beyond  the  brain
(save by intentionality and causal interfacing).
As  Dan Lloyd says,  we  already are  brains  in
vats! The cranium is the vat! (See  Lloyd 2004
pp. 244-245.)
Haven’t we learned from dreams, hallucin-
ations,  ALS,  direct  brain  stimulation,  and
locked-in syndrome that consciousness does not
need anything but the relevant brain functions
to exist? Of  course,  the functioning brain de-
pends  upon a  properly  functioning  body,  but
this does not mean that consciousness should be
identified with those (other) bodily functions in
some way. If  we go this  route,  adding bodily
correlates to neural correlates, when the latter
causally  and  distally  depend  on  the  former,
what  is  stop  us  from  adding  everything  the
body depends upon to our list of correlates (the
gravitational  constant,  the  bonding  properties
of molecules, the stability of the proton, etc.)? 
True,  at a certain level  of  analysis,  it  is
hard to say precisely where the nervous system
ends and the rest of the body begins. But then
the same can be said for the body and the rest
of the world (especially given that we routinely
appropriate, by breathing and eating, parts of
that world). The boundaries are fuzzy at a cer-
tain scale, but this does not mean we should say
there are no boundaries at all. Moreover, causal
dependencies and interdependencies are myriad,
but the causal relation is not the parthood rela-
tion—we cannot infer from “X causally depends
on Y” that Y is a part of X. Human conscious-
ness, as it is currently implemented, causally de-
pends on respiration, but this does not mean
that respiration is part of consciousness or that
the  physiological  correlates  of  respiration  are
also correlates of consciousness. 
If  it  is true that consciousness resides in
the brain and depends on our specific homeo-
static and metabolic processes only contingently
(and I mean physically contingently, not merely
logically  contingently),  then  saying  that  con-
sciousness  requires  an  organism as  a  subject-
pole starts to look a little fishier. This brings
me to the second main reason why I would re-
ject the claim that the whole organism is the
phenomenological subject of consciousness. 
What,  after  all,  is  an  organism?  It  is
clearly not  just  a collection of  parts.  We can
agree with the Aristotelian tradition that it is a
functional unity. We can agree that it is a sys-
tem that, in virtue of its form or organization,
is able to give rise to temporal successors (and I
don’t necessarily mean offspring) that maintain
that form or organization (at least for a while
and at least within the range of conditions it
evolved to live in). The matter always changes,
but the form remains, from cradle to grave. 
The organism takes matter from its envir-
onment to keep its processes going. And relative
to  its  function  of  maintaining  homeostasis
(thereby giving rise to temporal successors that
have the same organization it does) and to the
scale at which those functions are, so to say, vis-
ible, we can truly say that the organism behaves
like a goal-directed  whole with interdependent
parts  and  processes  (and  organs—the  heart
needs the lungs; the lungs need the heart; the
kidneys need the stomach, etc.). This is all fine
and dandy. But it is clear that organs are not to
be identified with the whole organism. Skipper
is  not  Skipper’s  heart,  though without  it  (or
some  suitable  artificial  replacement)  little
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Skippy would soon cease to be an organism at
all and eventually become soil (or parts of other
organisms).
More to point here, the brain is not the
organism.  Consciousness  resides  in  the  brain.
We could,  in  principle,  preserve  consciousness
simply by preserving the functioning brain.  If
this is true, then you do not need an organism
for there to be consciousness, you just need a
suitable organ—the brain. 
I would never deny, of course, that we nor-
mally represent ourselves as having a body and
relating  to  a  world  through  that  body.  No
doubt about it. Moreover, I believe it is meta-
physically necessary that any consciousness be
embodied in some substrate and that this em-
bodiment configures consciousness in a way that
is phenomenologically accessible to a certain ex-
tent. And, of course, we are organisms with a
certain  natural  history.  All  of  this  “facticity”
does indeed configure our consciousness to one
degree or another.  If  all  the organismal claim
comes down to is that conscious beings are ne-
cessarily acquainted with their own contingent
embodiment  in  a  certain  manner,  then  I  will
wholeheartedly agree. If it means that, contin-
gently, consciousness evolved out of and is still
connected  to  basic  homeostatic  functions  (in
some way), I will regard the claim as a not im-
plausible hypothesis to be investigated. 
This last claim is not, it seems to me, ex-
actly  what  Damasio  (see  Damasio 2010,  ch.
2)and  philosophers  who  follow  him  on  this
point, like Charles Nussbaum (2003) and appar-
ently Schlicht himself, mean. They want to say
something stronger. Like Francisco Varela (who
possibly influenced Damasio on this point, see
Damasio 1999, p. 347; cf.  Varela 1979;  Matur-
ana & Varela 1980), they seem to want to con-
nect consciousness essentially in the constitutive
sense to the kinds of processes that are involved
in homeostasis and the very emergence of an in-
ternal  organism/non-organism  distinction.  It
may well be that the subject/object distinction
apparent  in  consciousness  is,  in  evolutionary
terms, some sort of extrapolation of this more
basic  distinction.  It  is  clear,  however,  that,
whatever the exact relation, the organism/non-
organism distinction  in,  say,  the  immune sys-
tem,  cannot  just  be  identified  with  the
subject/object distinction in consciousness. On
Damasio’s  view  (as  I  understand  it  anyway)
consciousness arises out of multiple, integrated
layers of representation of the organism/non-or-
ganism distinction, where this representation it-
self has a certain regulatory function. 
I certainly agree with Schlicht (this collec-
tion, p. 7) that,  for Damasio, organismal and
objectual representations have to be integrated
in the right way for there to be something it is
like for the organism, and I did not mean to
suggest otherwise. This does not, however, make
Damasio’s theory a non-representationalist the-
ory (no more than the poise requirement makes
Tye’s  theory  non-representationalist  (see  Tye
1995, p. 138, 2000, p. 62). As long as represent-
ation  is  considered  a  necessary  condition  for
consciousness, the theory is representationalist,
by my lights. And since the relevant representa-
tions,  in  Damasio’s  theory,  include,  centrally,
representations of the organism, it still qualifies
as a P-theory in my sense—the organism is a
privileged  object.  The  representations  that,
when integrated, constitute consciousness, must
include representations of the organism, accord-
ing to the theory. Whatever else is represented
in conscious mental states, on this sort of view,
the organism certainly is. And the organism (ul-
timately in its guise as the “core self”)  could
thus serve as the phenomenological subject of
consciousness. 
I  do  understand  how  such  a  theory  at-
tempts to capture  subjective  character.  In  ef-
fect, it bundles it up into an object of a special
sort that is always represented (one way or an-
other) in any conscious mental state. For vari-
ous reasons (e.g., the Fichte-Shoemaker Regress,
see  Henrich 1982;  Frank 2004;  Frank 2007, pp.
157ff.;  Shoemaker 1968),  I  do  not  think  that
such a theory can do the trick. Briefly, it is not
enough  simply  to  represent  some  object  that
you just happen to be. That is not sufficient to
ground  the  manifest  indexicality  (the  “I  am
this, here, now” aspect) of our conscious experi-
ence. Also, it is somewhat puzzling to require
that consciousness representations have to have
some  specific  type  of  content.  Consciousness
seems to be so flexible in this regard, that is
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odd to think that there is such a “magic” object
of representation. By contrast, I view subjective
character  (“reflexivity”)  as  a  formal  or  struc-
tural feature of consciousness and not as a mat-
ter  of  representing  some  object  or  other
(whether consciously or unconsciously)—includ-
ing “the organism”. In fact, I believe such views,
while on the right track relative to views that
disregard subjective character, get the cart be-
fore the horse. The representation of oneself as
a self or an particular organism depends upon
reflexivity, and not the other way around. 
For an organism (call it O) to benefit from
representing  an  organism interacting  with  the
world and with other organisms, there must be
some way that in encodes that it is O (and not
anything  else).  In  effect,  it  needs  a  “you are
here” (or rather “I am here”) dot on its map, a
kind  of  “fixed-point”  (see  Ismael 2007).  The
mapper needs to know where it is on the map it
has made. On pain of regress, it cannot derive a
representation  like  “I  must  be  here  and  not
there, this organism on the map and not that
one” without having some antecedent, unmedi-
ated  self-reference  or  primitive  self-knowledge
(again, see Shoemaker 1968). Without this dir-
ect self-reference, the best we could hope for is
a system that just happens to control itself by
representing something that resembles itself in
the relevant ways. Such a system might as well
be controlling an exact duplicate in a duplicate
room next door. We do not get manifest index-
icality, self-location, or subjective character out
of this. A system built up around reflexivity or
direct self-reference (or primitive self-knowledge,
if you prefer), would have all the control func-
tions of a system that lacks it as well as these
other features of subjectivity. Following a sug-
gestion by Metzinger (personal communication),
though with a certain modification, I would be
happy to call  this  kind of  reflexivity “preper-
sonal”.  As such,  it  is  the basis  for one’s  con-
scious representation of oneself as a person, or-
ganism, or anything else for that matter; but it
is not essentially the representation of a person
or an organism. Rather, it is the reflexivity of a
process that happens to be housed in an organ-
ism (and in an organ within that organism) and
that  allows  that  organism  to  self-locate  in  a
multiplicity of spaces (physical, social, semantic,
etc.). 
I would add that that reflexivity could not
itself be purely representational, as I argued in
the paper. It very well could be, however, that
reflexivity was first achieved in the evolution of
organismic control systems and that these con-
trol  systems  have  everything  to  do  with  the
maintenance  of  homeostasis,  though  this  is  a
contingency. That does not seem implausible to
me at all. But that is a hypothesis about the
evolutionary origin of self-acquaintance, not an
account of what self-acquaintance is or how it is
routinely generated and supported in the brain. 
3 Unity, individuation, and integration
This brings me to Schlicht’s second and third
claims. Schlicht is absolutely right, of course, to
press me on the need for an account of the syn-
chronic and diachronic unities of consciousness
and for an account of the individuation of epis-
odes and streams of consciousness (this collec-
tion, p. 5). I bracketed such worries because I
have not worked out any such accounts to my
own satisfaction.  I  do,  however,  disagree with
Schlicht on the idea that regarding the organ-
ism  as  the  subject  of  consciousness  can  help
with individuation (this collection, p. 6). It is,
in  my  view,  not  much  easier  to  specify  the
metaphysical individuation conditions for an or-
ganism than it is to do so for an episode of con-
sciousness. And it is problematic to assume that
the  brain  has,  so  to  speak,  figured  out  what
these conditions are for us. It is true that the
brain must regulate a certain set of  functions
and processes in order to facilitate the mainten-
ance of homeostasis; and I can even grant that
doing so involves “representation” in a teleose-
mantic or functional-role sense. But this is or-
thogonal to any issues about the metaphysical
individuation  of  organisms.  While  it  may  be
easier to say what sort of processes an organism
must involve (see above) and to roughly localize
those processes than it is to say when one epis-
ode of consciousness begins and another ends, it
is no easier to provide the ultimate metaphysical
individuation conditions that ground the iden-
tities of the more basic physical processes that
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both organisms and consciousness depend upon.
At the end of the day we are always left turning
our spades with the thought that there just ex-
ists  a  plurality  of  things  in  the  cosmos—this
proton (or bare particular or property or loca-
tion) is not that one—end of story!
In  the  case  of  consciousness  there  is  no
special problem of metaphysical individuation, if
what we are talking about is the fact that these
episodes  over  here  are  in  “my” head (in  this
brain), and those over there are in “your” head
(in that brain). From a purely epistemic point
of view, it does indeed seem to be the case that
we individuate episodes of consciousness by ref-
erence to individuated organisms. But so what?
This is a mere contingency. If, say, we saw con-
scious processes (or their correlates) first, and
only with great effort could we locate the organ-
ism to which the processes were attached, we
would individuate organisms by referring to the
streams of consciousness that “own” those or-
ganisms. There is what we might call the “epi-
stemic  relativity  of  individuation”.  This  does
not mean that there are no mind-independent
facts about what ultimately individuates things.
It just means that, since we have no access to
what the ultimate individuators are, no particu-
lar way we individuate something should be re-
garded as privileged. We are guided by practical
and  interest-relative  considerations.  We  might
as  well  talk  about  the  acorns’  squirrel  rather
than  the  squirrel’s  acorns,  but  squirrels  are
more entertaining to us. 
In any case, for any physical process, once
you drink the metaphysical individuation Kool-
Aid, you won’t come back to normal. At some
point you’ll just find yourself saying “this is not
that”.  And  anything  you  scratch  (from  uni-
verses,  to  stars  and planets,  to  organisms,  to
molecules and particles) will fall apart in this
connection.  I  believe  there  are  real  unities  in
nature  and  that  conscious  mental  states  are
such real unities (it follows that I think certain
brain processes are too), but from the epistemic
and conceptual point of view Nagarjuna and the
Madhyamikas seem to be right—we cannot pin-
point  the  basic  individuators  anywhere,  they
just seem to dissolve upon analysis one way or
another  (see  e.g.,  Westerhoff 2009).  I  believe
such individuators exist but that they are inac-
cessible to us. And, as I argued in the paper, it
is a serious confusion to think that in being self-
acquainted you ipso facto have access to what it
is  that  ultimately  individuates  you.  You  are
aware  of  the  unity  and  individuality  of  your
episodes of consciousness, but those features, in
turn, could depend on other unities and indi-
viduation conditions that you have no access to
(cf. Williford 2011, pp. 202-203).
I am as happy as the next bloke to claim
that conscious mental episodes arise and even-
tually  give  way to  the  next  conscious  mental
episodes.  Perhaps  they  overlap  somehow  to
form a stream. Or perhaps they are punctate
and we could empirically determine their tem-
poral boundaries; I do not know. It is, however,
clear that my conscious episode of reading H.P.
Lovecraft for nostalgia’s sake before bed is not
the conscious episode of eating yogurt for break-
fast that I began the day with. But is it the
same  organism that  eats  in  the  morning  and
reads  in  the  evening?  It  is  indeed,  given  our
normal  (possibly  partly  pragmatic)  individu-
ation  criteria  for  organisms.  One  would  not
have to be Heraclitus, however, to notice that
the being that started the day is quite different
from  the  one  that  unwisely  decided  to  read
Lovecraft  before  bed.  And  at  a  certain  very
fine-grained  level  of  analysis,  it  is  a  radically
different being. 
We say things like “I ate yogurt this morn-
ing” and “I read Lovecraft at the age of 14” and
“I  am reading  Lovecraft  right  before  bed  to-
night”. We take this “I” to refer to the same or-
ganism and to the same “autobiographical self”
to use Damasio’s term or same “ego” in Sartre’s
sense of  the word.  But as  Sartre pointed out
(2004,  pp.  7-9),  no  such temporally  extended
and dubitable entity could be entirely present in
consciousness (so as to serve as its subjective
character). Instead we have only a set of pro-
cesses that remain more or less constant (and of
course  a  causal-historical  chain  that  is  not
broken).  But the whole causal-historical  chain
does not exist at the present moment. It cannot
be  packed  into  a  single  conscious  episode
(though it  could,  of  course,  be represented in
one). Nor can it, as a real pole of identity, exist
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throughout all conscious episodes. There is no
transcendental ego. Nor is there any transcend-
ental organism. An appeal to the organism does
not, just by itself, help us with the diachronic
unity  problem  or  the  individuation  problem.
And  though  the  brain  may  somehow  uncon-
sciously always “represent” us as organisms (in
perhaps the teleosemantic sense of “represent”),
it is evident that we are not always conscious of
ourselves as organisms (whatever exactly that is
supposed to mean). Yet subjective character is
there whenever consciousness is. 
Thus, I do not see how the organismal the-
ory helps with either the individuation problem
for conscious episodes and streams or  the  re-
lated diachronic unity problem. But it  is  also
not obvious to me how the organismal theory
could help us with the synchronic unity issue
either—the issue  of  how different  phenomenal
and  representational  contents  get  integrated
into whole,  unified conscious mental  states  or
episodes. I fully agree with Schlicht that a brain
process  (e.g.,  an  “unconscious  perception”  of
something)  can  be  integrated  into  conscious-
ness,  making a new whole,  and then possibly
slip out again.  And I  too like Edelman’s and
Tononi’s “Dynamic Core” idea (see Edelman &
Tononi 2000, Part IV) as a way of conceptualiz-
ing this integration and dis-integration. And I
would emphatically reject the “micro-conscious-
ness” idea of Zeki (see  Zeki 2007). It does not
seem to help to imagine many consciousnesses
in  the  brain  that  somehow  meld  together  to
make a bigger one. (At least I hope it is not like
that!)
In  connection  with  this,  I,  like  most
people, believe that normally there is only one
stream of consciousness existing in a given brain
(with split-brain cases perhaps being an excep-
tion). I prefer the idea that consciousness is a
type of process that has certain generic, essen-
tial structural features (temporality, subjective
character,  phenomenal  character,  representa-
tional  character)  and certain  variable  features
(this comes down to variability of phenomenal
and  representational  characters  at  different
times). Due to some constantly fluctuating in-
tegration process,  the phenomenal and repres-
entational  characters  of  consciousness  are  al-
ways in flux, while temporality and subjective
character remain invariant. Moreover, phenom-
enal  and  representational  characters  are  such
that  they  can,  so  to  speak,  expand and con-
tract. 
I can be hearing Bach’s Musikalisches Op-
fer while staring at a Jackson Pollock painting.
I  can  then  close  my  eyes  so  that  only  the
beauty remains in my consciousness. If I open
them again, then the visual horror will be rein-
tegrated into it. When I closed my eyes there
was “contraction”; when I opened them again,
“expansion” back to the “size” the experience
was before I closed them. There must indeed be
something  that  accounts  for  this  integration
process and the resulting synchronic, differenti-
ated unity of consciousness. 
I  completely agree with Schlicht that we
need a theory that allows us to understand how
something enters consciousness and how it gets
integrated into a whole with other things that
have already entered consciousness, but I do not
know  what  that  theory.  Moreover,  I  do  not
know if it is possible to have a conscious experi-
ence of but one sensory quality in one modality
(say,  the  auditory  consciousness  of  a  pure  C
tone) without any other thoughts,  imaginings,
perceptions,  or  anything  else.  I  would  say,
though, that if one could, that episode of con-
sciousness would still have subjective character
(and temporality).
Though I agree that we all need an integ-
ration story, it is quite unclear to me that that
story alone will give us a story about subjective
character,  unless,  like  Van Gulick (see  e.g.,
2004; cf. Metzinger 1995), one thinks that sub-
jective character as a kind of reflexivity emerges
out of integration. That may be, though I have
never understood how, exactly, that is supposed
to happen on Van Gulick’s view (though I do
have some sense of what he means). It is not
clear to me how this is supposed to happen on
Schlicht’s view either (see this collection, p. 11).
But I would be quite pleased if an account like
this could be made to work, since deriving re-
flexivity from integration would, it seems to me,
be a theoretical advance. 
In any case, for me, subjective character as
reflexivity  is  a  phenomenological  given.  It  is
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part of the data set from which I begin. It is my
“Phenomenological  Muse”.  I  could  be  wrong
about its importance, of course, but until I am
shown that, I will explore the model space that
is appropriate to that intuition and leave it to
empirical testing to determine whether or not
the  Muse  was  lying  to  me.  (I  will  add,  in  a
purely psychologistic vein, that many philosoph-
ers  are  allergic  to  reflexivity  for  purely  irra-
tional  reasons.  They  just  find  it  odd  or  too
complicated or too puzzling. So they see it as
an advantage if they can offer an account that
gets around the need for it. For me this is like
taking Marlon Brando out of Apocalypse Now or
preferring decaf coffee to the real deal.) 
As I see it, subjective character is like a
universal  or  form.  It  is  just  the  “reflexive”
structure of consciousness. It is not to be reified
into an entity (or refried like a bean, for that
matter). If we think of it as an entity, we will
find ourselves puzzling over questions about mo-
mentary  subjects  and  how  all  these  different
subjects relate to each other over time and at a
time. This is a confusion in my view. Yes, our
normal use of language and the naïve ontology
it  encodes  demand entities  and substances  to
correspond to our nouns! But consciousness is
not an entity or substance. It is a process; it is
more like a wave than the medium the wave re-
quires. It has a certain structure and a certain
dynamical profile.  Subjective character is,  like
temporality, an ever-replicated form that, in my
view, is necessary for all consciousness. There is
no subject entity strictly speaking. When there
is an episode of looking back down the tunnel of
previous conscious episodes that are connected
in the normal way to that very episode of con-
scious looking, individuated subjective character
is always seen. Just in terms of subjective char-
acter, all the episodes are qualitatively identical.
This helps reinforce the illusion of a stable, con-
tinuous subject entity.3 Again, there is no such
entity. There is just a common form or struc-
ture living in the many different tokens. After
Parfit (1984) and the Buddhists, we might say
that  this  at  once  helps  dissolve  the  thing we
3 See Hofstadter 2007, ch. 7, “The Epi Phenomenon”, for a nice analogy in
this connection: the illusion of a marble in the center of a box of envelopes
arises just from the stacking of the envelopes (with their repeated structure).
once thought so substantial and important and
draws us closer to other tokens, no matter what
stream they happen to be in.
Finally, it seems to me that Schlicht (this
collection, p. 7) must take “creature-conscious-
ness” to be more fundamental than “state-con-
sciousness”  (or  “episode-consciousness”),
whereas I would adhere to the usual idea that
phenomenally conscious creatures are just those
that host episodes (or states) of consciousness. I
don’t see how reversing this order helps. 
4 Conclusion
To recapitulate: (1) I do not see what is gained,
either in relation to the individuation problem
or the unity and integration problems, by re-
garding the organism as the phenomenological
subject of consciousness. (2) I understand how
P-theories attempt to do this by making the or-
ganism part of the representational content of
every episode of consciousness, but I do not find
those theories  plausible  or  helpful,  even if  we
stress  the  integration  aspect  of  the  theories
(which does not make them cease to be P-theor-
ies). (3) I was less clear on how Schlicht thinks
that  an  integration  theory  could  account  for
subjective  character  if  it  deviates  from  the
Damasio-style  theory  or  from  Van  Gulick’s
HOGS model, which latter I have also always
found a little hard to understand, though I am
in sympathy with it. (4) I would emphatically
deny the existence of Zeki-style micro-conscious-
nesses; rather, I believe there is (normally) only
one stream of consciousness per brain—and that
stream can “expand and contract” as more or
less gets integrated into it. (5) We do need an
account of how unconscious processes get integ-
rated into consciousness and of both diachronic
and synchronic unity; but I am not prepared to
offer such an account at present. (6) Regardless
of how such an account goes, I take reflexivity
(self-acquaintance) to be an essential structural
feature of all consciousness; and I take it to be a
phenomenological  datum.  All  streams  of  con-
sciousness are immediately aware of themselves,
and that is the foundation of all other forms of
self-representation,  autobiographical  cognition,
and  so  on.  (7)  This  reflexivity  is  subjective
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character (for-me-ness), but it is a mistake to
turn this structural feature into a kind of entity
or homunculus. Thus in saying that the episode
is the phenomenological subject, I am offering a
non-homuncular account of the subject of con-
sciousness. This ought to reduce a little bit of
the weirdness of my claim that the episode is
the  phenomenological  subject.  (8)  In  other
senses of “subject”, it is undoubtedly correct to
say that the subject of consciousness is the or-
ganism, since it is (so far) organisms that have
consciousness.  However,  strictly speaking, con-
sciousness is a sub-process of the organism and
lives in one of its organs—the brain. (9) Since
we could, in principle, have conscious, function-
ing brains without the rest of the organism, it
seems to  follow that  the  organism is  not  the
phenomenological subject—unless one adopts a
P-theory according to which the privileged ob-
ject we represent is just the organism we hap-
pen to be; but see (2) above. 
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